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David Hitchcock’s rather comprehensive book On Reasoning and Argu-
ment. Essays in Informal Logic and on Critical Thinking is a (revised and 
supplemented) collection of the author’s essays on these broad topics, which 
were published independently during his long-lasting career of almost fi fty 
years. As such, it fulfi ls the role of Hitchcock’s long-awaited monograph on 
central issues in informal logic and critical thinking, both of which he had 
been teaching as a university professor at McMaster University in Canada. 
Though he had (co)-authored two other books earlier (Critical thinking: A 
guide to evaluating information, 1983. and Evidence-based practice: Logic 
and critical thinking in medicine, 2005), former of them a textbook, only 
On Reasoning and Argument provides a systematic overview of his views 
on informal logic and critical thinking, emphasizing inter alia in the con-
cluding part of the book that these two notions should be carefully distin-
guished; fi rst one pertaining to “sub-discipline of philosophy that seeks to 
develop criteria, standards and procedures for the construction, identifi ca-
tion, analysis, interpretation, evaluation and criticism of arguments” (511), 
different from the one employed in formal logic, and second one pertaining 
to “a process of refl ectively thinking about an issue with a view to reaching 
a reasoned judgment on what is to be believed or done” (511), an educational 
ideal which is to be fostered at all levels. The book is divided into several 
parts (I–VII), each of which comprises several chronologically ordered chap-
ters—essays, accompanied by References and ending in a Postscript, written 
in retrospect for the purpose of this publication. In the Postscripts Hitchcock 
summarizes his theses from the chapters-essays, providing additional in-
formation on their genesis and adding critical remarks to his earlier views 
where needed. The book is also equipped with Index of names and concepts 
and a helpful Foreword by J. Anthony Blair, who encouraged Hitchcock to 
publish it in the fi rst place, and a Preface by Hitchcock himself.
In Part I (Deduction, Induction and Conduction), composed of two es-
says written almost four decades apart, Hitchcock dwells on two well-es-
tablished distinctions in argumentation theory (or philosophy of argumen-
tation, as he puts it); deduction vs. induction—when it comes to different 
types of argument validity—and linked vs. convergent—when it comes 
to two or more reasons supporting a claim. Concerning the fi rst topic, 
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Hitchcock in his original essay rejects objections to deduction vs. induction 
distinction on grounds (i) ‘that some traditionally inductive and some tra-
ditionally deductive arguments provide conclusive grounds for their con-
clusions and some do not’ (objection by Perry Waddle) and that (ii) recon-
structing arguer’s intention is necessary to classify arguments as of one 
type or another. Ad (i), Hitchcock points out that reasons for a claim being 
conclusive is not equivalent to argument’s being deductive and that fi lling 
inductive arguments with premisses which would turn them into deductive 
ones is not possible due to premisses not being justifi ed independently of 
the conclusion. Ad (ii), although conceding that appraisal is concerned with 
arguments, not arguers, he maintains that “using a version of the principle 
of charity in settling on the standards by which to assess an argument. 
That is, we should assess it by those standards which give it the best chance 
of being a cogent argument” (19). As far as the linked vs. convergent dis-
tinction is concerned, Hitchcock considers it useful but only when applied 
non-derivatively to types of support of premisses to a conclusion and only 
derivatively to argument structures. Main revision in the Postscript to the 
original text consists in defi ning inductive strength as a type of support or a 
standard of appraisal, not as type of validity (33).
Part II (Material Consequence), containing six chapters, is probably cen-
tral to the book since it addresses issues which have, according to Hitch-
cock himself, occupied him throughout his career. Starting with a paper on 
enthymematic arguments, Hitchcock emphasizes two problems regarding 
them which haven’t been satisfactorily solved: (i) the demarcation problem, 
i.e. distinguishing enthymemes from deductively valid arguments on the 
one hand and mere non sequiturs on the other hand and (ii) the evaluation 
problem, i. e. how to evaluate the inference in an enthymematic argument 
(40). He rejects defi ning enthymems as arguments whose authors have 
omitted one or more premises for two reasons: (i) we are often not in a posi-
tion to question the arguer about whether the arguer had another premise 
in mind and (ii) authors of acknowledged enthymemes often have no addi-
tional premise in mind (43). He accepts the alternative approach according 
to which the implicit assumption of an enthymematic argument is a rule of 
inference (non-formal rule since its statement includes at least one content 
expression) in virtue of which the conclusion follows from the premisses 
(53). In the following chapter he continues the same idea, discussing vari-
ous conceptions of logical consequence (64–68) and opting for introduction 
of enthymematic consequence, he revises defi nition of logical consequence 
in the following way: conclusion is a consequence of given premisses in the 
revised generic sense if the argument has a general feature which is in-
compatible with the argument’s having true premisses and a false conclu-
sion, even though it is both compatible with its having true premisses and 
compatible with its having a false conclusion (77), thus he is able to defi ne 
enythmematic consequence as one where the general feature includes a 
reference to at least one extra-logical constant. Similarly, he defends Ste-
phen Toulmin’s notion of warrants as general rules of inference, not implicit 
premisses, answering objections to his distinction between data or grounds 
and warrants. Hitchcock further advances an ontic, not epistemic concep-
tion of inferential support according to which the conclusion of an argument 
 Book Reviews 259
might have inferential support though an addressee of the argument is not 
aware of its having it. He requires that inference-licensing covering gen-
eralizations be not only true (or otherwise acceptable) but also capable of 
supporting counterfactual instances.
In Part III (Paterns of Reasoning), composed of seven essays, Hitchcock 
deals with various issues, starting with validity of non-deductive argu-
ments. He rejects his earlier position of methodological deductivism, i. e. 
proposal that “non-deductive arguments could be treated as if they were 
deductive, as long as one recognized that the proposition one added to make 
the argument deductively valid was not entirely the responsibility of the ar-
guer, that it could in certain respects be presumed to be true unless shown 
otherwise” (199) and proposes methodological conclusivism instead, i. e. 
treating non-conclusive arguments as conclusive if a proposition to which 
the author is committed by the argument is added, presuming the added 
proposition to be true until shown otherwise. Examining reasoning by anal-
ogy and acknowledging its various kinds, Hitchcock aims to give criteria for 
good analogical inference according to his general theory of good inference, 
but also to discard the thesis of epistemological subject specifi city of analog-
ical reasoning. In essay on Pollock’s model of practical reasoning, Hitchcock 
applauds his point that “practical reasoning requires not only the beliefs 
and desires which theorists of practical reasoning have required for mil-
lennia, and not just the additional distinct category of intentions for which 
Michael Bratman has argued, but also likings” (223). He objects incomplete-
ness of the model due to lack of interconnected features of communication 
between rational agents, social cooperation and the recognition of moral 
constraints, Hitchcock also considers Pollock’s requirement of a cardinal 
measure of situation-likings applicable only to computational simulation 
of a rational agent, but no to human beings (222). In the following essay 
on argument schemes he argues for a combined top bottom and bottom up 
approach (e. g. Woods and Walton) due to theoretical arbitrariness of the 
former and empirical inadequateness of the latter, acknowledging that the 
system of schemes needn’t be complete but comprehensive. In essays con-
cerning instrumental rationality and practical reasoning, where “Instru-
mental rationality”, i.e. the rational selection of means for achieving a given 
goal is analyzed as more complex than fi nding an effective means of getting 
to a chosen goal (ensurement of achievability of the goal and permissibility 
of means, determination that no alternative means is preferable, weighing 
side effects and benefi ts of achieving the goal etc.). Discussing what Trudy 
Govier labels “conductive arguments”, Hithcock argues that they’re better 
described as appeals to considerations or to criteria where the conclusion 
may follow either conclusively from its premisses or non-conclusively or not 
at all. He emphasizes that weighing the pros and cons is only one, and prob-
ably the last way to judge whether the conclusion follows.
The rather short Part IV (Interpersonal Discussion) is Hitchcock’s enter-
prise in exploring dialectical aspects of argumentation, however emphasiz-
ing that although study of argument must take these into account, both de-
scriptively and prescriptively, it often exaggerates in viewing all arguments 
as in a dialectical setting (336). He also stresses important features of argu-
ments which are in common with monological reasoning, such as their infer-
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ential structure and their components’ epistemic status. He is chiefl y con-
cerned not with rules which are supposed to guide a rational mutual inquiry 
(he acknowledges that the title is a bit misleading), but sets of principles to 
which such rules should comply (315). Hitchcock concludes that the study of 
formal dialectical systems can have both theoretical and practical benefi ts 
(clarifi cation of dialectical concepts like proponent and opponent, explor-
ing various commonly recognized fallacies, especially those like begging the 
question), many questions etc. which only occur in interpersonal discus-
sion). Additionally, he proposes amendations to Ralph Johnson’s Manifest 
Rationality, primarily concerning Johnson’s use of term argumentation as a 
sociocultural activity of producing, interpreting and evaluating arguments; 
Hitchcock believes term argumentative discussion is more appropriate and 
in line with other authors’ use (cites e. g. early Pragmadialectics). He also 
objects tp Johnson’s positioning argumentative discussion prior to the con-
cept of argument in the order of intelligibility, binding him to circularity in 
defi ning both concepts.
Part V (Relevance) discusses ontological status of relevance (relation, 
not a property), its relation to irrelevance (contradictory pair), types of rel-
evance etc. Defi ning relevance as a triadic relation between an item, an 
outcome or goal, and a situation, Hitchcock distinguishes epistemic from 
causal and practical relevance, focusing on the fi rst of the three. He de-
scribes epistemic relevance as irrefl exive, symmetric and vacuously transi-
tive in a strict sense, and in the loose sense it is either refl exive or irrefl ex-
ive (depending on the epistemic goal), non-symmetric and transitive (357). 
Concerning relevance within argumentative setting, an argument is said 
to have an irrelevant conclusion “if its conclusion cannot be ineliminably 
combined with other potentially accurate information to achieve the epis-
temic goal to which the argument is addressed. It has an irrelevant premiss 
if the premiss cannot be ineliminably combined with other potentially ac-
curate information to achieve the epistemic goal to which the argument is 
addressed” (367). Hitchcock discusses Locke’s ad fallacies of relevance and 
acknowledges them as fallacies of relevance with respect to the epistemic 
goal of instruction (such appeals don’t bring knowledge), but claims there 
are not necessarily irrelevant with respect to other epistemic goals, e. g. 
rational acceptance of a conclusion from authorities with expertise in a cog-
nitive domain to which the conclusion belongs. In essay ‘Good Reasoning on 
the Toulmin Model’ Hitchcock examines individually necessary and jointly 
suffi cient conditions for good reasoning (justifi ed grounds, adequate infor-
mation, justifi ed warrant, justifi cation in assuming no exceptions apply) in 
the Toulmin model, comparing it to parallel approaches of argumentation 
schemes and their critical questions.
In Part VI (Fallacies) Hitchcock discusses a more general issue of useful-
ness of teaching fallacies in teaching critical thinking and a more specifi c 
issue of ad hominem arguments. Inspired among other things by his own 
experience in teaching fallacies to students, Hitchcock advances several ar-
guments against fallacies having central role in teaching critical thinking: 
(i) the correct identifi cation of an argumentative move as a fallacy requires 
a complex apparatus of analysis, hence it makes more sense to teach the 
analytical apparatus for correct reasoning than to begin with the fallacies; 
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(ii) fallacy labels are not necessary to the exercise of critical thinking; every-
thing that can be said with the use of these labels can be said without them 
(in general said more clearly); (iii) fallacies approach is unduly negative 
and fosters an attitude of looking for the mistake and labelling it, instead 
of dealing with the substance of what one is discussing; (iv) learning the 
fallacies is of no help in constructing good arguments of one’s own and ap-
preciating the merits of good arguments, which are components of critical 
thinking. Adopting Ennis’ defi nition of critical thinking as reasonable and 
refl ective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do, Hitch-
cock emphasizes its constructive and reactive aspects which particularly 
goes against fallacies approach (425). He is also concerned with discrep-
ancy between empirical data on types and frequency of mistakes in reason-
ing and traditional catalogue of fallacies (which John Woods named Gang 
of Eighteen). Discussing argument ad hominem, Hitchcock argues that it 
is not a fallacy in neither of its variants (abusive, circumstantial, tu quo-
que) due to the conception of a fallacy as a common mistake in reasoning 
that is commonly deceptive, but a legitimate dialectical strategy (similar 
to Woods’ approach). However, he believes ad hominem attacks are neces-
sary in teaching critical thinking since they concern fi nding good sources of 
information (students should learn under which conditions allegations of 
bias, incompetence or bad character are relevant to judging the quality of a 
source of information).
In the concluding Part VII (Informal Logic and Critical Thinking) Hitch-
cock discusses place of informal logic in philosophy, different concepts of 
argument which can be found within it, its relation to critical thinking and 
effectiveness of teaching critical thinking. As far as the fi rst topic is con-
cerned, Hitchcock is akin to classify informal logic as philosophy of argu-
ment, a sub-discipline of philosophy in its own right, particularly address-
ing often stated remarks on informal logic as applied or social epistemology 
(Battersby, Goldman), which he believes start from mistaken point of 
equating informal logic to critical thinking (which is a topic in philosophy 
of education). As mentioned above, Hitchcock accepts Ennis’ defi nition of 
critical thinking and further differentiates it from the logical appraisal of 
arguments in extending beyond a single argument, thus having a creative 
component, and involving critical assessment of evidence. Critical think-
ing requires both skills, attitudes and dispositions which enable the criti-
cal thinker to think critically when required and do it well. Examining ef-
fectiveness of instruction in critical thinking, Hitchcock observes that its 
success is rather moderate, with more signifi cant improvement in courses 
involving computer-assisted tutoring (argument mapping) or which are 
combined with writing instruction and practice (student discussion).
Although lacking a textbook structure, On Reasoning and Argument 
offers an informative overview of main topics in informal logic and criti-
cal thinking. It is probably more suitable for readers already introduced in 
these topics, although may appeal to novices. Hitchcock’s careful approach 
is a fi ne example to younger scholars working in argumentation theory.
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